function liquidate(address v, uint256 id) external { · prevHash <- headHash // append-only · mediation: MODIFY -> severity = CRITICAL (IMP-C1) · assert(obligation.ownershipTransferState == APPROVED); · merkleRoot = H(H(e1,e2), H(e3,e4)) // head 9c41e0…a7d2

require(healthFactor(v) < 1e18, "healthy"); · + require(msg.sender == pendingOwner); · uint256 cf = reserve.freshCollateralFactor(); · IMP-C1 Critical direct theft of user funds · flashLoan(amount); _reenter(); _settle(); // guarded

sha256(payload) = 3f9a2b7c…c21e // event #17 · forge test --match-contract Vault --fuzz-runs 50000 · [PASS] test_exploit_drainsHealthyPosition() (gas: 412338) · - cf = reserve.collateralFactor; // no freshness check · require(cf.updatedAt > block.timestamp - 1 hours, "stale");

reward = min(max(pct * fundsAtRisk, floor), cap) · function liquidate(address v, uint256 id) external { · prevHash <- headHash // append-only · mediation: MODIFY -> severity = CRITICAL (IMP-C1) · assert(obligation.ownershipTransferState == APPROVED);

merkleRoot = H(H(e1,e2), H(e3,e4)) // head 9c41e0…a7d2 · require(healthFactor(v) < 1e18, "healthy"); · + require(msg.sender == pendingOwner); · uint256 cf = reserve.freshCollateralFactor(); · IMP-C1 Critical direct theft of user funds

flashLoan(amount); _reenter(); _settle(); // guarded · sha256(payload) = 3f9a2b7c…c21e // event #17 · forge test --match-contract Vault --fuzz-runs 50000 · [PASS] test_exploit_drainsHealthyPosition() (gas: 412338) · - cf = reserve.collateralFactor; // no freshness check

require(cf.updatedAt > block.timestamp - 1 hours, "stale"); · reward = min(max(pct * fundsAtRisk, floor), cap) · function liquidate(address v, uint256 id) external { · prevHash <- headHash // append-only · mediation: MODIFY -> severity = CRITICAL (IMP-C1)

assert(obligation.ownershipTransferState == APPROVED); · merkleRoot = H(H(e1,e2), H(e3,e4)) // head 9c41e0…a7d2 · require(healthFactor(v) < 1e18, "healthy"); · + require(msg.sender == pendingOwner); · uint256 cf = reserve.freshCollateralFactor();

IMP-C1 Critical direct theft of user funds · flashLoan(amount); _reenter(); _settle(); // guarded · sha256(payload) = 3f9a2b7c…c21e // event #17 · forge test --match-contract Vault --fuzz-runs 50000 · [PASS] test_exploit_drainsHealthyPosition() (gas: 412338)

- cf = reserve.collateralFactor; // no freshness check · require(cf.updatedAt > block.timestamp - 1 hours, "stale"); · reward = min(max(pct * fundsAtRisk, floor), cap) · function liquidate(address v, uint256 id) external { · prevHash <- headHash // append-only

mediation: MODIFY -> severity = CRITICAL (IMP-C1) · assert(obligation.ownershipTransferState == APPROVED); · merkleRoot = H(H(e1,e2), H(e3,e4)) // head 9c41e0…a7d2 · require(healthFactor(v) < 1e18, "healthy"); · + require(msg.sender == pendingOwner);

uint256 cf = reserve.freshCollateralFactor(); · IMP-C1 Critical direct theft of user funds · flashLoan(amount); _reenter(); _settle(); // guarded · sha256(payload) = 3f9a2b7c…c21e // event #17 · forge test --match-contract Vault --fuzz-runs 50000

[PASS] test_exploit_drainsHealthyPosition() (gas: 412338) · - cf = reserve.collateralFactor; // no freshness check · require(cf.updatedAt > block.timestamp - 1 hours, "stale"); · reward = min(max(pct * fundsAtRisk, floor), cap) · function liquidate(address v, uint256 id) external {

prevHash <- headHash // append-only · mediation: MODIFY -> severity = CRITICAL (IMP-C1) · assert(obligation.ownershipTransferState == APPROVED); · merkleRoot = H(H(e1,e2), H(e3,e4)) // head 9c41e0…a7d2 · require(healthFactor(v) < 1e18, "healthy");

+ require(msg.sender == pendingOwner); · uint256 cf = reserve.freshCollateralFactor(); · IMP-C1 Critical direct theft of user funds · flashLoan(amount); _reenter(); _settle(); // guarded · sha256(payload) = 3f9a2b7c…c21e // event #17

forge test --match-contract Vault --fuzz-runs 50000 · [PASS] test_exploit_drainsHealthyPosition() (gas: 412338) · - cf = reserve.collateralFactor; // no freshness check · require(cf.updatedAt > block.timestamp - 1 hours, "stale"); · reward = min(max(pct * fundsAtRisk, floor), cap)

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